Habit formation, strategic extremism, and debt policy by Matsen, Egil & Thøgersen, Øystein
 
 
 
 
 
Institute for Empirical Research in Economics 
University of Zurich 
 
Working Paper Series 
ISSN 1424-0459 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Working Paper No. 468 
Habit formation, strategic extremism, and debt policy 
Egil Matsen and Øystein Thøgersen 
January 2010 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Habit formation, strategic extremism, and debt policy*
 
 
 
Egil Matsen 
Dept. of Economics, Norwegian University of Science and Technology, NTNU, NO-7491 Trondheim, 
Norway. Email: egil.matsen@svt.ntnu.no Phone: +47 7359 7852 
 
 
Øystein Thøgersen 
Dept. of Economics, Norwegian School of Economics and Business Administration, and CESifo, 
Helleveien 30, NO-5045 Bergen, Norway. Email: oystein.thogersen@nhh.no 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Abstract 
 
We suggest a probabilistic voting model where voters’ preferences for alternative public goods display 
habit formation. Current policies determine habit levels and in turn the future preferences of the voters. 
This allows the incumbent to act strategically in order to influence the probability of reelection. 
Comparing to a benchmark case of a certain reelection, we demonstrate that the incumbent’s optimal 
policy features both a more polarized allocation between the alternative public goods and a debt bias. 
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1.  Introduction 
 
A hundred days into George W. Bush’s presidency, The Economist entitled its cover story “That 
shocking conservative”. The story was about the common perception among political commentators 
and pundits of a president pushing a much more conservative agenda, on e.g., tax cuts, than his 
campaign platform had suggested. Glaeser et al. (2005) provide more systematic evidence showing 
that politicians often implement policies that are more extreme than their political platforms. They 
report that Democrats and Republicans in the United States on the one hand have very similar, 
moderate platforms on tax policy. On the other hand evidence reveals rather big differences in mean 
tax rates between Democratic and Republican administrations. 
 An account by McCarty et al. (2006) argues convincingly that increased polarization in US 
policy is observed along several dimensions, including taxes, minimum wages, immigration and social 
assistance. Moreover, polarization is also evident in the debate related to issues like abortion and 
religious values in general (Glaeser et al. 2005). Thus, “speaking of convergence in American politics 
today seems completely out of touch with reality” according to a recent paper by Alesina and Holden 
(2008: 2). Alesina and Holden also point at experience from the French presidential election in 2007 
as well as the 2008 legislative elections in Italy and Spain as evidence of polarization. 
 Polarization and extreme outcomes may also characterize decisions related to public spending 
and its composition. A prominent example is the sharp increase in defense spending during the Reagan 
administrations in the United States. In his campaign, Reagan had run on a strong defense platform. 
Then, his first budget increased spending by much more than expected by the top military staff. In his 
memoirs, retired general and Joint Chiefs of Staff, Colin Powell (1995: 258-259) describes this in 
highly illustrative and amusing terms: “This was Christmas in January. This was tennis without a net.” 
According to Powell, the military leaders got even more money than they asked for according to their 
submitted “dream lists” of projects. It turned out that the first defense budget of the Reagan 
administration managed to increase the inherited budget of the preceding Carter administration by 
11%.     
 Why would an elected politician want to pursue more extreme policies than his party platform 
suggests? One possibility is that party leaders have extreme preferences (Alesina 1988) which in turn 
can lead to implementation of more extreme policies than indicated by the electoral platforms (Glaeser 
et al. 2005). While politicians’ ideological preferences are important, we would still expect the desire 
for reelection to moderate policies that seem extreme relative to voters’ preferences. 
This paper demonstrates that extreme policies in terms of a more polarized resource allocation 
may occur not because the incumbent has extreme preferences, but because it makes the incumbent’s 
desired future policy appeal to a larger group of voters. More specifically, we suggest that voters’ 
preferences are characterized by reference levels that are affected by current policies, and politicians 
can use this link strategically to influence the probability of reelection.  
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We consider a political framework where potential partisan governments disagree with respect 
to the composition of public spending, as in Alesina and Tabellini (1990) (henceforth “AT”) and 
Tabellini and Alesina (1990) (henceforth “TA”). Crucially, we suggest that voters’ utilities over given 
levels of spending on each public good depends on how that level compares to what they are used to, 
i.e., their habit level. Compared to a benchmark case of a certain reelection, this gives the incumbent 
incentives to implement more polarized allocations. By supplying more today of his most preferred 
public good, the incumbent can push up voters’ habit levels and correspondingly their future marginal 
utility of this good. This will increase the probability of reelection. 
The assumption that preferences are characterized by reference dependence in the form of 
habit formation has been explored in many branches of economics recently (but, to our knowledge, 
this paper represents the first attempt in the field of political economy.) It is most common in studies 
of consumption; see Deaton (1992) for a survey.1
The habit formation hypothesis is in accordance with psychological research that suggests that 
individuals’ satisfaction is determined by actual outcome relative to some reference level; see, for 
example, Fredrick and Loewenstein (1999), Rabin (1998, 2002), Caporale et al. (2007), and also the 
prominent prospect theory of Kahneman and Tversky (1979).  
 More recently, it has proved to be successful in 
stochastic, consumption-based analyses of asset prices; see, for example, Campbell and Cochrane 
(1999), and also in studies of growth (Carroll et al. 2000) and stabilization policy (Ljungqvist and 
Uhlig 2000). Habit formation implies that the satisfaction an individual realizes from a given 
consumption level tends to depend more on the change in consumption (i.e., the deviation between 
actual consumption and a historically determined habit level) than on the level itself. 
 Traditionally, the assumption of habit formation has been related to individuals’ private 
consumption. We will argue, however, that habit formation is equally important for any voter’s 
preferences for most types of public goods. This is consistent with the findings of Solnick and 
Hemenway (2005) who report preliminary evidence in favor of reference dependence in the evaluation 
of public goods.2 For example, habit formation seems crucial for voters’ welfare assessments of the 
spending levels on essential public goods like schools and education, health services, and maintenance 
of roads and other types of infrastructure.3
                                                 
1 The general idea of habit formation in consumption seems to be formulated by James Duesenberry; see, for example, 
Duesenberry (1949). Other early contributions include Ryder and Heal (1973) and Easterlin (1974). 
 Consistent with our specification of habit formation below, 
we assume that increased spending on one of these types of goods today will raise the associated habit 
level of the voters and increase their marginal utility of a given future spending level.   
2 Solnick and Hemenway (2005) analyze positional concerns as determinants of reference levels, analogous to external habit 
formation in some other contributions to this literature. 
3 What we have in mind is mainly the public consumption part of such spending – and not the real investment part. This 
includes wage expenditures, maintenance, repair and various operating expenditures. The argument is that the habit formation 
mechanism is not necessarily related to the investments in, say, hospital or school buildings, but to the quality and volume of 
public services provided from these buildings. Going back to the jump in defense spending during the Reagan years, which 
was highlighted above, we note that Powell (1995) stresses that the generous budget to a large extent funded what he called 
“bread and butter expenditures” just like wages, training, maintenance and spare parts (i.e. public consumption items). 
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It is also likely that habit formation is relevant for voters’ assessment of particular transfer 
schemes or the social security system in general. This is in accordance with Romer’s (1996) analysis 
of the political process leading to the implementation of the US social security program back in the 
1930s. President Roosevelt at that stage created an entitlement for a large number of people to future 
social security benefits. According to Romer, this changed the political dynamics. If a successor tried 
to scale back the program, that would “induce anger and a taste for retribution in large numbers of 
voters” (p. 199). This line of reasoning seems fully consistent with our idea that voters’ preferences 
change in favor of the incumbent’s spending priorities due to habit formation.  
Models of political behavior generally assume that voters’ policy preferences are exogenous to 
actual policies.4
Cukierman and Tommasi (1998) explain how the implementation of significant policy 
reversals hinges on the ability of the incumbent to signal successfully the importance of this particular 
policy move. Given that voters are imperfectly informed about how varying external circumstances 
influence the mapping from policies to outcome, today’s announcement of policy platform provides a 
signal that in the next stage feeds back on voters’ assessment of the policy and consequently on their 
voting behavior that ultimately determines whether the platform is implemented. 
 There is, however, a scant literature that captures feedback effects from policies to 
preferences. For example, Cassing and Hillman (1986) model the interaction between the size of an 
industry and the political support it receives in terms of protection, for example, by means of tariff 
policy. The current level of protection influences the size of the industry. In the next stage, this feeds 
back on political preferences because changes in industry size alter the political gains and costs of a 
given level of protection. 
The German reunification of 1990 seems to provide evidence for the existence of important 
feedback effects from economic policy to individual preferences. Alesina and Fuchs-Schündeln (2007) 
use the reunification as a “natural experiment” to test the relationship between political regime and 
individual preferences. They strongly conclude that there is a causal link from policies to preferences. 
Alesina and Fuchs-Schündeln identify the fact that people “get used to” certain policies as one of the 
reasons for this link. Our model takes this fact seriously in the sense that we model how current 
policies determine habits and the future preferences of the voters.  
 We are not the first to analyze how political extremism can appear for strategic (i.e., vote-
maximizing) reasons. Glaeser et al. (2005) present a model where strategic extremism occurs because 
it energizes the incumbent’s core constituents more than it energizes the opponent’s supporters.5
                                                 
4 An exception is retrospective voting models where voters punish the incumbent by voting against him if he acted against 
their interests when in office. In contrast to this backward-looking model, voters are fully forward-looking in our set-up. We 
also note that models of directional voting (see Rabinowitz and Macdonald 1989) give the status quo a central role in voting 
behavior. As in our analysis, this model incorporates a reference point in decision making. Unlike in our model, however, the 
reference point gives voters incentives to vote strategically; our reference points give politicians incentives to act 
strategically. 
 Note, 
however, that they focus on extreme platforms rather than actual policies. Indeed, their model predicts 
5 Closely related is the idea that extremism reflects candidates’ attempts to obtain campaign contributions; see Alesina and 
Holden (2008). 
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that extremism in policies is due to extreme preferences of candidates, whereas platform extremism 
occurs for strategic reasons. Our analysis shows that extreme actual policies also can occur for 
strategic reasons. We share this feature with Glazer et al. (1998). They explore a model where an 
incumbent has incentives to implement extreme policies because it creates a cost to voters of changing 
the party in power. Their results hinge critically on the assumptions that there is a fixed cost associated 
with a policy change and that politicians are (partly) office motivated. This contrasts with our model 
where parties are outcome oriented and the election winner can implement preferred policies without 
any frictions. 
 Our paper is closely related to the strategic debt literature initiated by Aghion and Bolton 
(1990), Persson and Svensson (1989), AT (1990) and TA (1990).6 Building on the models of AT and 
(particularly) TA, we explore a model where different potential governments disagree about the 
composition of public goods provision.7
The next section of this paper presents our model, and briefly discusses the benchmark case 
where the initial government is certain about reelection. Section 3 considers equilibrium policies when 
the incumbent acts strategically in the face of uncertainty about reelection. Section 4 offers some final 
remarks. 
 As extensions, we include probabilistic voting and habit 
formation in voters’ preferences for public goods. It turns out that the extreme resource allocation of 
the incumbent is accompanied by a strategic debt bias. This debt bias is caused exclusively by the 
incumbent’s attempt to influence the probability of reelection. As explained in more detail below, it 
complements the strategic debt effects identified by AT and TA. 
 
 
2. An intertemporal model with probabilistic voting  
 
Adopting the probabilistic voting approach of Persson and Tabellini (2000, section 13.3), we consider 
a political environment consisting of two competing political parties (J = D, R) with two associated 
natural constituencies in the form of identically large groups of voters (j = d, r). The two parties are 
outcome oriented and, following AT (1990) and TA (1990); they disagree about the composition of 
public spending. As did TA, we consider a two-period framework. For simplicity, we disregard 
discounting of utility and assume that the real interest rate is zero.  
 
 
 
                                                 
6 This strategic debt literature is part of the broader literature on how an incumbent can influence potential successors by 
altering alternative state variables. For example, Cukierman et al. (1992) apply this idea to taxation, while Glazer (1989) 
considers the choice of public investments in this context. Crain (2001) survey’s the early literature on strategic fiscal policy, 
and discusses how it is related to models of the durability of political institutions.  
7 The alternative approach taken by Persson and Svensson (1989) is to assume that governments disagree about the public 
spending level vs. private consumption.   
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2.1 Parties 
Party J is characterized by the period-utility function  
(1) t
J
t
JJ
t gfu log)1(log αα −+= , 
where tf  and tg  are the spending levels on the two public goods in period t, t = 1,2. The parameter 
Jα , 10 ≤≤ Jα , captures the preferences of party J for the composition of the goods. Party R attaches 
a higher weight to the utility of tf  than party D, i.e., 
DR αα >  and we assume, as Persson and 
Tabellini, that 2
11 >−= DR αα . For concreteness, we assume that the period 1 incumbent is an R-
government. Because the model is symmetric in every aspect, all results generalize directly to the case 
of an incumbent D-government. As we will highlight and explain below, our specification of log 
utility has the intended, appealing property that it allows us to focus exclusively on the strategic 
effects of current policies on the reelection probability of the incumbent.  
The government in each period is endowed with one unit of output and has access to a perfect 
global financial market. Thus, the resource constraints are given by 
(2a) bgf +=+ 111  
and 
(2b) bgf −=+ 122 , 
where b is public debt. 
As discussed in the introduction, tf  and/or tg , could be interpreted quite broadly, and might 
capture the magnitude of the social security program or particular transfer schemes. Stretching the 
model, we might even imagine that the two goods capture the magnitude of resources available for 
respectively private and public spending.8
 In period 1 the incumbent R-government faces an endogenous probability,
 
Π , of not being re-
elected for period 2. If  re-elected, the R-government sets its preferred policy, Rff 22 =  and 
Rgg 22 = . 
If replaced, the policy of the succeeding D-government must be accepted,  Dff 22 =  and 
Dgg 22 = . 
Thus, the R-incumbent determines optimal policy in terms of 1f , 1g  and, consequently b, by the 
maximization of 
(3) ( ) ( )RRRDDRR gfugfugfu 222222111 ,)1(,),( Π−+Π+ , 
subject to (1), (2a) and (2b) and given perfect knowledge about i) how Π  depends on the chosen 
policy and ii) how the alternative D-government will behave in period 2 if elected. Our modeling of 
the voters’ preferences will imply that Π  is a function of the intra-period split between 1f  and 1g  as 
well as the intertemporal distribution of resources (b).  
                                                 
8 If we choose the interpretation that tf  and tg  are respectively resources available for private and public spending, then we 
also have to assume that the unity-endowment applies to the whole economy.   
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Analyzing how the incumbent will utilize the link between policy-choices and Π , we will 
compare the outcome with a benchmark case of  certain reelection for the R-government, i.e., Π = 0. It 
follows from (1), (2a), (2b) and (3), that our benchmark is given by 
(4)  Rtf α= ,  )1(
R
tg α−=  and  0=b , for 2,1=t . 
 
2.2 Voters 
The utility of voter i in group j is given by 
(5) Dijjj Kuu )(21 δσ +++ , 
where jtu  is the period t utility of  the provided package of public spending. The dummy variable 
DK  
is one in the case of party D holding office in period 2 and zero in the case of party R. The parameter 
ijσ  reflects an idiosyncratic bias towards party D for voter i belonging to group j. This bias reflects 
non-economic ideological factors, and has a mean-zero uniform distribution with density φ in both 
groups. The variable δ is a stochastic, aggregate popularity shock for party D. It is drawn from a mean-
zero uniform distribution with density ψ.  
 The period-utility functions of the voters in group j are given by 
(6) t
j
t
jj
t GFu log)1(log αα −+=   (t = 1, 2), 
where tF  and tG  are the surplus spending levels on the two public goods, reflecting our specification 
of dynamic habit formation in the voters’ preferences for public goods. Capturing that past spending 
levels increase the marginal utility of current spending levels (see Deaton 1992: 30 or Sundaresan 
1989), we have that 
(7a) 1−−= ttt ffF γ , 
and 
(7b) 1−−= ttt ggG γ , 
where γ , 10 <≤ γ , indicates the strength of the habit formation mechanism (andγ  = 0 implies 
additive separable preferences). The magnitudes of 0f  and 0g  are given by history. We assume that 
the relevant values of γ  ensure 0>tF  and 0>tG . 
 Capturing that group j is the natural constituency of party J, we assume that rR αα =  and 
dD αα = . Still, the existence of ideological concerns and popularity shocks, as introduced in (5), and 
habit formation may all imply that segments of the voters may take voting decisions that are not in 
accordance with their fellow constituency members. 
 A crucial feature of the model is the fact that voters’ preferences are characterized by habit 
formation, while this is not the case for the preferences of the parties. This reflects two concerns. First, 
we wish in particular to highlight that voters’ preferences are endogenously determined by policies. 
This is modeled by a mechanism that is more transparent if the parties’ preferences do not change in 
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response to the implemented policies. Second, studies of party manifestos suggest that political 
parties’ policy preferences are relatively stable over time. Using post WWII time series data for 25 
democracies, Budge and Klingemann (2001) report that - while there are some changes in party 
positions over time - estimated party preferences within individual countries do generally not leapfrog 
or overlap. Hence, it seems reasonable to assume that political parties to a large extent represent basic 
ideas, and implied views about resource allocation, that remain more stable over time than the 
preferences of large segments of the voters. 
 
 
3.  The political equilibrium 
 
The timing of the political decisions is as follows: In period 1 the R-incumbent sets its preferred policy 
in terms of 1f , 1g  and b. There is no room for policy commitment. An election is held at the start of 
period 2. The winning party then sets period 2 policy in terms of 2f  and 2g . As usual, we solve the 
model backwards. 
 
3.1 Post election policy 
Assume that party J wins the election. The chosen period 2 policy is then determined by the 
maximization of Ju2 , see (1), subject to (2b) when b is inherited from period 1. This yields 
(8a) )1()(2 bbf
JJ −= α  
and 
(8b) )1)(1()(2 bbg
JJ −−= α . 
Utilizing the period 1 budget constraint, (2a), it follows from (7a), (7b), (8a) and (8b) that the realized 
period 2 surplus spending levels, JFF 22 =  and 
JGG 22 = , can be written as (reaction-) functions of 1f  
and 1g :  
(9a) 111112 )2(),( fgfgfF
JJ γα −−−= , 
(9b) 111112 )2)(1(),( ggfgfG
JJ γα −−−−= . 
An increase in the period 1 spending on one of the goods, say 1f , has two distinct effects on the period 
2 surplus spending levels. The direct ‘habit effect’ lowers period’s 2 surplus spending on the same 
good through a higher habit level, i.e., the effect of 1f  on the last term on the RHS of (9a). In addition, 
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there is a ‘debt effect’ that lowers both surplus spending levels, i.e., the first term on the RHS of both 
(9a) and (9b).9
 
 
3.2 Voting decisions 
Turning to voting decisions, we define ju2  as the difference in period 2 utility for group j if party D 
rather than party R wins the election. It follows from (6) that 
(10) ( ) ( )RDjRDjj GGFFu 22222 loglog)1(loglog −−+−= αα . 
Being perfectly informed about the intensions of the alternative governments, voter i from group j will 
choose to vote for party D if ( )δσ +−> jij u2 ; see (5). Normalizing the size of each of the two groups 
to 2
1 , it follows (as seen by the illustration in Figure 1) that the number of voters for party D is 
(11) ( ) ( ) ( ) δφφφδφδ +++=




 +++




 ++= rdrdD uuuuN 2222 2
1
2
1
2
1
2
1
2
1
2
1 . 
 
*** Fig. 1 *** 
 
*** Fig. 2 ***  
 
We have that ( )2111 Prob),( >=Π DNgf . Recalling that the popularity shock, δ , is uniformly 
distributed with a zero mean and a density equal to ψ , it follows from (11) that 
(12) ( )rd uugf 2211 2
1
2
1),( ++=Π ψ , 
see Figure 2. Consequently, in order to investigate how the period 1 policy influences the probability 
of reelection, we have to consider the derivatives: 
(13a) 






+=
Π
1
2
1
2
1 2
1
df
ud
df
ud
df
d rd
ψ  , 
(13b) 






+=
Π
1
2
1
2
1 2
1
dg
ud
dg
ud
dg
d rd
ψ . 
From (9a), (9b), (10) and the assumption that DR αα −=1 , we derive 
(14a) 






−−−







−−







−=+ RD
D
RD
D
DR
rd
FGGFFFdf
ud
df
ud
2222221
2
1
2 11)1(1111 ααγ , 
                                                 
9 By (9a) and (9b), period 1 policies must fulfill γ < αD(1-b)/f1 and γ < (1-α
R)(1-b)/g1 = αD(1-b)/g1, respectively, for utility in 
period 2 to be well-defined (see equations 3a and 3b). We assume that these restrictions hold. 
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where the first term on the RHS captures the habit effect as defined above and the two remaining 
terms capture the debt effect. Using (9a) and (9b), we collect the last two terms and rewrite (14a): 
(14b) 





−
−
−+







−=+ RD
D
DR
D
DR
rd
GFGF
gf
FFdf
ud
df
ud
2222
11
221
2
1
2 1)(11 ααγγ . 
Because DR αα >  and, accordingly, DR FF 22 > , the habit effect is negative. This means that more 
settled habits reduce voters’ utility of given levels of Jf 2 . Because 
RD ff 22 < , the concavity of the 
utility function implies that the drop in all voters’ utility is larger in the case of a D-government than 
for an R-government.  
Noting that the term in brackets in the last part of the RHS of (14b) is negative (as shown in 
the Appendix), we conclude that the debt effect has the opposite sign of )( 11 gf − . This reflects that a 
higher debt reduces both Jf 2  and 
Jg 2 , which lower voters’ surplus spending levels disproportionally, 
depending on the magnitudes of the habit levels, 1fγ  versus 1gγ . If  11 gf > , the drop in 
JF2  is more 
painful than the drop in JG2 , implying that all voters’ assessment of the political parties are tilted in 
the favor of the R-government that will ensure the smallest reduction in 2f . Correspondingly, the case 
of 11 gf <  implies a debt effect that favors voters’ assessment of the D-party. Summing up, it follows 
for 0>γ  that the expression in (14b) is strictly negative if 11 gf ≥  and ambiguous if 11 gf < . 
 The derivation of how rd uu 22 +  responds to changes in 1g  is analogous. Using (9a), (9b) and 
(10), we compute 
(15) 





−
−
−+







−=+ RD
D
DR
D
DR
rd
GFGF
gf
GGdg
ud
dg
ud
2222
11
221
2
1
2 1)(11 ααγγ . 
The habit effect of a higher 1g  favors party D, i.e., the first term on the RHS is positive, while the debt 
effect also favors party D if 11 fg > . Provided that 0>γ , the expression in (15) is therefore strictly 
positive if 11 fg ≥  and ambiguous if 11 fg < . 
 Returning to the effects on the probability of reelection of changes in respectively 1f  and 1g  
(including the induced debt effect), we observe from (13a) and (13b) that they are proportional to the 
derivatives in (14b) and (15). The effects are also proportional to the magnitude of the density ψ . As 
illustrated in Figure 2, this simply reflects that a higher ψ implies that a given change in rd uu 22 +  will 
influence the voting behavior of a larger group of voters. Moreover, it follows from (14b) and (15) that 
the ability of the incumbent to use current policies to influence Π  hinges on the habit formation 
mechanism, i.e., 0>γ .10
                                                 
10 Note that in the probabilistic voting framework of Persson and Tabellini (2000: section 13.3) the ability of the incumbent 
to influence the probability of reelection hinges completely on the assumption that the uniform distributions for 
 
iRσ  and 
 10 
 
3.3 Equilibrium policy 
The R-incumbent sets policy in period 1. This policy is his best response to the derived expected 
reaction of the voters (at the election) and to the derived policy of the opposition if they seize power in 
period 2. 
Using (1), (8a), (8b), (2a) and the condition RD αα −=1 , we rewrite the expected utility 
function of the R-incumbent, (3), as 
(3b) ),()2log(log)1(log 111111 gfBAgfgf
RR Π++−−+−+ αα . 
Here A and B are negative constants (recall that DR αα > ), 
(16) 0)1log()1(log <−−+= RRRRA αααα , 
(17) ( ) 0)1log(log)21( <−−−= RRRB ααα . 
 Maximization of (3b) with respect to 1f  and 1g  yields the first-order conditions 
(18a) 0
2
1
1111
=
Π
+
−−
−
df
dB
gff
Rα , 
(18b) 0
2
11
1111
=
Π
+
−−
−
−
dg
dB
gfg
Rα . 
It is useful first to consider the corner case of no habit formation mechanism, i.e., 0=γ , which 
implies that 0
1
=Πdf
d  and 0
1
=Πdg
d . We then obtain Rf α=1 , )1(1
Rg α−=  and, from (2a), b = 0. This is 
equivalent to the benchmark case of a certain reelection, see (4). The intuition follows from TA 
(1990). When Π  is exogenous and less than one, the incumbent on the one hand benefits from 
increased debt because it provides more of the most preferred composition of public spending today 
and, as a consequence of less total future spending, it also “forces” the potential alternative 
government to set the composition of public spending in period 2 closer to the incumbent’s 
preferences. One the other hand, increased debt harms the incumbent because it implies a less smooth 
utility profile over time. The degree of concavity in the utility function determines whether a debt or 
surplus bias is optimal on strategic grounds.11
Π
 It turns out that log utility is the borderline case where 
the two opposite effects exactly cancel out. In the context of the present paper that assumes log utility 
at the outset, this is a useful property because it allows us to focus exclusively on the strategic effects 
of current policies on . 
 From (18a) and (18b), we obtain 
                                                                                                                                                        
iDσ  have different densities. By the assumption of a similar density ψ ,  this mechanism is deliberately disregarded in our 
model.   
11 In the extreme case of completely opposite preferences, 1)1( =−= DR αα , a debt bias is always optimal when 1<Π  
because the incumbent will regard the alternative government’s spending as pure waste. 
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(19) 




 Π
−
Π
=
−
−
1111
1
df
d
dg
dB
gf
RR αα . 
Using (13a), (13b), (14b) and (15), it is straightforward to verify that 
(20) 01111
2
1
222211
>
















−−







−=




 Π
−
Π
DRDR FFGGdf
d
dg
d
ψγ  for 0>γ . 
Recalling that the constant B is strictly negative, see (17), we conclude from (19) that: 
 
PROPOSITION 1: When 0>γ , the period 1 R-incumbent sets 1f  and 1g  such that R
R
g
f
α
α
−
>
11
1 . 
 
Comparing to the benchmark case of a certain reelection (see (4)), or the case with an exogenous 
reelection probability (γ = 0), this proposition implies that the incumbent chooses a more polarized 
allocation between the two public goods in the sense that the size of the gap 011 >− gf  has increased. 
Thus, rather than to cater to the middle as predicted by a median voter model, the incumbent’s 
political-strategic reasoning leads him to choose a more extreme intra-period distribution of the two 
public goods. 
 In order to consider debt policy, we note that the first-order conditions (18a) and (18b) imply 
(21) ( ) 




 Π
+
Π
−−+=+
1
1
1
11111 22
11
dg
dg
df
dfBgfgf . 
Because B < 0 and 0)2( 11 >−− gf , it follows that 111 >+ gf  if the term in brackets on the RHS is 
strictly negative. As demonstrated in the Appendix, this condition is satisfied when 0>γ . Thus: 
 
PROPOSITION 2: Given 0>γ , b > 0. 
 
Moreover, from Proposition 1 and Proposition 2, we immediately obtain: 
 
PROPOSITION 3: Given 0>γ , the R-incumbent sets Rf α>1 . 
 
Consequently, the incumbent’s choice of polarization in the sense of a larger gap between f1 and g1 
involves an increase in the supply of his most preferred good - as compared to the case of certain 
reelection. 
Propositions 1 and 2 imply that the incumbent chooses to “pay” for the greater probability of 
reelection by deviating from both his intra- and intertemporal first-best allocation of resources. We 
note that he could have increased the reelection probability by deviating only along the intra-period 
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dimension. Indeed, it is straightforward to show that proposition 1 holds even in the absence of debt.12
Our analysis can be summarized by Figure 3.
 
Allowing for debt, it turns out that the cost to the incumbent of a given decrease in Π is minimized 
when the distortion incurred due to polarization is smoothed by an intertemporal distortion caused by 
b > 0. Thus, debt allows the R-incumbent to widen the gap between  f1  and g1 by means of a jump in f1  
(i.e., proposition 3) which is not fully compensated by a similar drop in g1. 
13
0=γ
 In this figure, the intra-period indifference 
curves of the R-incumbent are denoted I, II, III and IV. The period 2 expansion path of the potential D-
successor is given by EPD, while the expansion path of the R-government in the case of  (i. e. 
when Π  is exogenous) is given by 
0
REP
=γ
. The benchmark solution of a certain reelection for the 
R-incumbent is given by point BR on the b = 0 budget line (in both periods). As explained above, the 
R-incumbent would also choose point BR in period 1 when Π  is exogenous and satisfies 10 <Π< . 
Then the period 2 allocations would be either at point BR if R wins the election or at point BD if D 
wins. 
 Given that the R-incumbent can influence Π , the optimal period 1 allocation is given by R1. 
Comparing to BR, the R-incumbent chooses b > 0, a larger gap between 1f  and 1g  and finally 
Rf α>1 . The R-incumbent now incurs costs in terms of both an inefficient intra-period allocation of 
resources in period 1 and an inefficient intertemporal allocation. These costs are worthwhile, however, 
because they are dominated by the increase in expected period 2 utility caused by a higher probability 
for the R2 allocation in period 2 rather than the D2 allocation.14
 
 
*** Fig. 3 *** 
 
 
4. Final remarks 
 
This paper has put forward a probabilistic voting model where habit formation in the voters’ 
preferences for alternative public goods implies a link from current policies, in terms of decisions on 
the composition of public goods and debt, to the probability for reelection. A forward-looking and 
output oriented politician who faces the chance of being replaced by an alternative government with 
different preferences for the composition of public goods, will act strategically and utilize this link in 
order to increase the probability of reelection. Comparing to either the benchmark case of a certain 
                                                 
12 If b is set exogenously equal to zero, most of the analysis is simplified somewhat. Terms in equations (8a), (8b), (9a), (9b), 
(14a), (14b) and (15) become zero. The key equations (19) and (20) are not altered, however, leaving proposition 1 
unchanged.  
13 Figure 3 is inspired by Figure 1 in TA (1990: 44). 
14 Corner solutions are avoided as long as 0 < αJ < 1, because marginal utilities will approach infinity when public good 
supplies approach zero. 
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reelection or the case of an exogenous probability of reelection (due to 0=γ ), we have shown that the 
incumbent chooses a larger initial period budget share for his most preferred public good. This pushes 
up all voters’ habit levels for this good. As a consequence, all voters’ assessments of the incumbent’s 
preferred future policy will be more favorable, leading in turn to a higher probability of reelection. 
Moreover, we have also demonstrated that the greater polarization in the resource allocation in the 
initial period is accompanied by a deficit bias. 
 Our predictions call for a search for empirical evidence. As mentioned in the introduction, 
Glaeser et al. (2005) and McCarty et al. (2006) report some striking observations of seemingly 
surprisingly polarized policies in the United States along several dimensions. We also argued that the 
US public spending and deficit patterns observed during the Reagan era were consistent with the 
predictions of our analysis. It is still fair to say that formalized empirical evidence of polarized policies 
is in short supply. Looking at the debt-dimension, there are plenty of observations of sustained public 
deficits in many major OECD economies (see for example OECD 2006). As surveyed by Persson and 
Tabellini (2000: section 13.3.4) it has proven hard to provide robust empirical evidence for suggested 
strategic motives.15
With respect to AT (1990) and TA (1990), their prediction of an inverse relationship between 
the magnitude of the (exogenous) probability of reelection and the size of the deficit has been rejected 
by existing empirical studies. Our findings suggest a quite different relationship, however: a deficit 
and a polarized resource allocation are means used by the incumbent to increase the probability of 
reelection. Thus, we believe that careful empirical analyses of potential co-movements between these 
three variables are warranted. As a motivation for such an effort in the future, we note that our finding 
seems to be in the spirit of the theory of political business cycles and loosely consistent with the 
stylized fact (as presented by Persson and Tabellini 2000: 393) that budget deficits tend to be larger 
during election years.      
 
Another interesting avenue for future research is to introduce a richer modeling of possible 
variations in the key parameters of politicians’ and voters’ utility functions. For example, the model 
could possibly be extended by allowing parties to choose their ideologies by electing their leaders.16
                                                 
15 One exception is a study by Petterson (2001). Using data for Swedish municipalities, he finds strong support for the 
strategic budget motive suggested by Persson and Svensson (1989). Crain and Tollison (1993) and Besley and Case (1995) 
provide related evidence on the impact of political incentives on fiscal policy in US states. 
 
Presumably, the parties would elect leaders with an ideology (as represented by αJ) that matches the 
established voter-habits. Our conjecture is that this would reinforce the extremism highlighted in this 
paper. The cost of choosing an extreme policy for a strategically elected leader would conceivably be 
lower than for an ‘ordinary’ party member. The exact mechanisms of a model where parties choose 
their ideologies are, however, left for future research. Another potentially promising extension is to let 
the strength of an individual voter’s habit formation for a particular public good be determined by his 
16 This idea borrows from the monetary policy literature that demonstrates that it might be optimal for a government to 
appoint a conservative central bank governor; see Rogoff (1985).  
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or her direct or indirect exposure to the good in question, i.e., voters that, for example, have been 
hospitalized may develop stronger habits for health services than other voters. 
 
 
Appendix 
 
Last term on the RHS of (14b) 
In order to determine the sign of the term in brackets on the RHS of (14b), we note that: 
(A-1) DRRD
DRDRDD
RD
D
DR
D
GFGF
GFGF
GFGF 2222
2222
2222
)1(1 αααα −−
=





−
− . 
Substituting from (9a) and (9b) and using that DR αα −=1 , we rewrite the numerator as 
(A-2) 
( )( )
( )( )111111
111111
)2)(1()2)(1(
)2()1()2)(1(
ggffgf
ggffgf
DDDD
DDDD
γαγααα
γαγααα
−−−−−−−−−
−−−−−−−− . 
Because 2
1<Dα  and 02 11 >−− gf , the numerator must be strictly negative, implying that the terms 
in brackets on the RHS of (14b) must be strictly negative as well. 
 
Proof of Proposition 2 
Proposition 2 hinges on the condition that the term in brackets on RHS of (21) is strictly negative, 
(A-2) 0
1
1
1
1 <




 Π
+
Π
dg
dg
df
df . 
Substituting from (13a), (13b), (14a) and (14b), and collecting terms, this condition can be written as 
(A-3) 01111)(1)(
2
1
22
1
22
111
2222
11 <
















−+







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
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g
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GFFG
gf γγααγψ . 
By Proposition 1 we have that 11 gf > . Using that the first part of this Appendix proves that the 
expression in (A-1) is strictly negative, it follows that a sufficient condition for (A-2) to hold is 
(A-4)  01111
22
1
22
1 ≤







−+







− DRDR GG
g
FF
f . 
Taking into account that 11 gf > , 
DR FF 22 >  and 
RD GG 22 > , (A-4) holds if 
(A-5) DRDR GGFF 2222
1111
−≥− , 
which after straightforward manipulations can be written as 
(A-6) 
1
1
1
1
)1)(1(
)1)(1(
)1(
)1(
fb
gb
gb
fb
R
R
R
R
γα
γα
γα
γα
−−−
−−−
≤
−−
−−
. 
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This condition is obviously satisfied because 11 gf > . This implies that condition (A-2) and in turn 
Proposition 2 are satisfied as well. 
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Fig. 1 Vote share of party D in group j, j = d, r 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 2 The probability that party D wins the election  
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Fig. 3 Optimal policies 
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